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The embroilment of the United States in Indochina was a tragedy for the 
peoples of that region. In the late 1940s, the Truman administration 
supported French colonial interests; in the mid 1950s, the Eisenhower 
administration decided to champion an independent non-communist South 
Vietnam under the leadership of Ngo Dinh Diem; in 1965, the Johnson 
administration decided to bomb North Vietnam and deploy combat troops 
to South Vietnam in order to thwart a communist victory. Over three 
decades, between two and three million Vietnamese perished as they 
struggled to gain their independence and shape their own future. After 
1965, much of their country was devastated by American bombing. 
Neighboring countries were engulfed by the strife and turmoil. In 1975, the 
Khmer Rouge seized power in Cambodia and committed ghastly atrocities. 
American policy failed, horribly. In the 1970s, regional strife proliferated; 
people suffered. How can this tragedy be explained? How can American 
policy in the region be understood? 
 In this brief essay, I shall attempt to explain how the United States 
got so deeply and tragically embroiled in Vietnam between 1945 and 1965. 
On one level, the answer is simple: the conflict in Vietnam was one of the 
hot wars spawned by the Cold War. On another level the answer is 
complicated because American officials never cared about Vietnam per se. 
In fact, they understood that Ho Chi Minh was a popular nationalist leader 
enjoying the support of the Vietnamese people. But, alas, Ho was also a 
self-declared Marxist-Leninist, and U.S. officials cared deeply about 
containing the spread of communism, everywhere. Vietnam unfortunately 
bore the brunt of American efforts, initially, to placate and co-opt the 
French and, then, to rehabilitate and co-opt the Japanese. Subsequently, as 
revolutionary nationalist turmoil spread in Southeast Asia and the Third 
World, Vietnam became a test case of American credibility to thwart 
Moscow’s and Beijing’s efforts to capitalize on wars of national liberation. 
As American credibility became increasingly invested in Vietnam, it also 
became a factor in domestic politics, at least, as perceived by leading 
Democrats like John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Baines Johnson. Neither 
president wanted to give the Republicans a chance to castigate them for 
losing Vietnam as Senators Joseph McCarthy, Richard Nixon, and other 




political opponents previously had ridiculed Harry S. Truman for ‘losing’ 
China. 
 The embroilment in Vietnam, therefore, was a complicated offspring 
of ideological rivalry and the Cold War, of decolonization and revolutionary 
nationalism, and of domestic politics. But personality also mattered. 
Kennedy wavered, but did not deploy combat troops and even talked of 
disengagement. Like Kennedy, Johnson did not want to convert the war in 
Vietnam into an American war. But circumstances deteriorated, and defeat 
seemed imminent. Would Kennedy have intervened in the same 
circumstances? Historians disagree. But there is little disagreement that in 
the winter and spring of 1965 Johnson’s fears, hopes and hubris 
transformed the nature of the American commitment. President Johnson 
escalated the war because he decided that he could not allow a communist 
triumph in a war of national liberation lest it redound to the advantage of 
his rivals in Moscow or Beijing. He could not permit America to appear 
weak lest it set an unfortunate precedent, perhaps encouraging other Third 
World leaders to recast their allegiance in the Cold War. Nor could he allow 
his partisan foes at home to use a communist victory in Vietnam to cast him 
as a president who had capitulated in the face of foreign aggression and had 
appeased totalitarian foes. If he were defeated abroad, his plans for a Great 
Society at home would be endangered. His reputation would be tarnished; 
his legacy dismissed. The convergence of domestic, international, and 
personal factors bestows a sense of inevitability around the Vietnam 
tragedy; it almost seems over determined. But was it? 
 
 
Origins of the U.S.Embroilment 
 
During World War II, the most important United States officials repeatedly 
declared their desire to see the end of imperial rule. ‘The president and I’, 
declared Secretary of State Cordell Hull in November 1942, ‘earnestly favor 
freedom for all dependent peoples at the earliest date practicable.’1 At 
wartime conferences, President Franklin D. Roosevelt favored trusteeship 
for Indochina. Colonialism, he said, meant degradation and poverty for 
indigenous peoples. After one hundred years of French rule, Roosevelt 
ruminated, the people of Indochina ‘are worse off than they were at the 
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beginning.’2 Colonialism, Roosevelt contended, meant war. ‘Don’t think for 
a moment’, Roosevelt told his son, Elliot, ‘that Americans would be dying 
in the Pacific tonight if it hadn’t been for the shortsighted greed of the 
French and the British and the Dutch.’3  
 In the closing weeks and months of the war, however, Roosevelt was 
unable to press forward his ideas of trusteeship. He was ill, and too many 
other priorities commanded his time and waning energy. Arguing with the 
British, French and Dutch about the future of their colonies seemed less 
important than winning their goodwill for postwar collaboration in Europe 
and elsewhere. To his dying day, Roosevelt favored eventual independence 
for Indochina, but he was willing, albeit grudgingly, to accept temporary 
French trusteeship in order to achieve more important goals.4
 When Roosevelt died, America’s most influential advocate of 
decolonization disappeared. His successor, Harry S. Truman, ‘knew nothing 
and cared little about Southeast Asia and Indochina.’5 Ho Chi Minh wrote 
Truman in 1945 asking for U.S. and U.N. support against the French. In 
talks with U.S. diplomats, Ho sought economic aid and intimated that he 
might offer the Americans a naval base at Cam Ranh Bay. But President 
Truman ignored Ho’s letters (as did the British and the Soviets). At the 
Potsdam Conference in July 1945, Truman agreed to allow the British and 
Chinese to occupy Indochina and manage the surrender and repatriation of 
Japanese troops. Shortly thereafter, U.S. officials indicated that they would 
not interfere with the restoration of French sovereignty, although Truman 
still hoped that the French would support self-rule. When Truman met with 
French President Charles De Gaulle at the White House in August 1945, 
Truman advocated independence but did not insist upon it.6
 Inside the Department of State and inside the American government 
there developed a struggle between officials oriented toward Europe and 
officials focusing on events in Asia. Asian experts fully grasped the appeal 
                                                 
2 McMahon, Limits of empire, 11. 
3 R.D. Schulzinger, A time for war: the United States and Vietnam, 1941-1975 (New York 1997) 
12-13.  
4 Ibidem, 16; G.R. Hess, ‘Franklin Roosevelt and Indochina’, Journal of American History 59 
(September 1982) 359-68; W. LaFeber, ‘Roosevelt, Churchill, and Indochina, 1942-1945’, 
American Historical Review 80 (December 1975) 1277-95; Lloyd C. Gardner, Approaching 
Vietnam: from World War II through Dienbienphu (New York 1988) 22-23. 
5 Schulzinger, Time for war, 17. 
6 W.J. Duiker, U.S. containment policy and the conflict in Indochina (Stanford 1994) 36-67; Gardner, 
Approaching Vietnam, 62-87. 




of nationalism in the region. They knew that Ho was a communist, but they 
also knew that his appeal to the people inhered in his fervent nationalism, 
his intense desire to liberate his country from French rule. But the advice of 
the Asian experts and the views of Office of Strategic Services (OSS) 
officers who had dealt with Ho during the war were trumped by top 
officials in the State Department and in the White House who were much 
more concerned about events in Europe. These Europeanists, like H. 
Freeman Matthews and James C. Dunn as well as Assistant Secretary of 
State Dean G. Acheson and Clark Clifford, Truman’s counsel in the White 
House, were much more focused on securing French goodwill, shoring up 
anti-communist parties, and refraining from complicating the lives of 
moderate French politicans who were opposed, either by principle or 
political expediency, to granting independence.7
 American officials grasped that the real challenge was to balance their 
interests in Asia and in Europe. ‘The essence’ of the problem, reported the 
Central Intelligence Agency in an early analysis, is ‘to satisy the nationalist 
aspirations of colonial peoples while at the same time maintaining the 
economic and political stability of European colonial powers (...) US 
security interests in Europe and the Far East are in danger of appearing as 
mutually exclusive, when, in fact, the power position of the US vis-a-vis the 
USSR requires that they be pursued concurrently.’8
 But it was not easy to achieve this balance because American power 
was limited and the principal actors in France and Indochina had political 
agendas of their own. The French rejected a negotiated settlement and their 
forces in Indochina often acted brutally to suppress the Vietminh. In this 
context, U.S. officials gradually decided to lean toward the French. They did 
not want to support French colonialism. They consistently and persistently 
pressed the French to make concessions, to grant real self-rule, and to 
accept the inevitability of independence. But they were unwilling to risk a 
rupture of relations over such matters and they were unwilling to jeopardize 
their foremost European priorities, like the implementation of the Marshall 
Plan, the reconstruction and unification of the western zones in Germany 
and the negotiation of the North Atlantic Treaty. The Americans needed 
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French collaboration to achieve these objectives.9
 In other words, waging the Cold War successfully in Europe trumped 
American support for decolonization. After the end of World War II, U.S.-
Soviet relations deteriorated quickly. In January 1946, President Truman 
began ruminating about his deep distrust of Soviet intentions and goals. 
‘Unless Russia is faced with an iron fist and strong language another war is 
in the making (...) I do not think we should play compromise any longer.’10 
In February 1946, Charge d’affaires George F. Kennan wrote his ‘long 
telegram’ to Washington from the embassy in Moscow, championing a 
containment strategy.11 Former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill 
visited the United States in February 1946 and delivered his famous speech 
in Fulton, Missouri saying that an iron curtain was descending on Europe.12 
In face of the perceived challenge from the Kremlin and the formidable 
strength of communist parties in France and Italy, and in view of the 
stagnation and paralysis of the economies in the western zones of Germany 
and in Japan, U.S. officials decided to concentrate on the economic 
reconstruction and non-communist political stabilization of western Europe 
and Japan. Support for nationalist movements in Asia, the Middle East and 
North Africa took a back seat to these priorities.13
 But U.S. officials were deeply troubled by the choices they felt forced 
to make. They knew that nationalist fervor would not subside. They were 
very much aware that the Kremlin could capitalize on the unrest in the 
Third world. Even before World War II ended, experts in the State 
Department were warning that ‘Communism has already made a strong 
appeal to nationalist movements in Southeast Asia.’14 Throughout the late 
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1940s, in one memorandum after another, one policy paper after another, 
Asian experts, intelligence analysts, and policy planners acknowledged that 
the United States had to be on the right side of history, that American 
officials should champion independence movements. If they did not, they 
would tarnish America’s image, damage its interests and allow the Kremlin 
to make inroads in regions that were strategically important and contained 
valuable resources and raw materials. State Department experts fumed at 
European officials who could not grasp that their own self-interest inhered 
in co-opting nationalist leaders and overseeing orderly decolonization. 
‘Short-sighted colonial policies’, argued one CIA review in September 1948, 
‘will in the long run cause the colonial powers to lose the very economic 
and strategic advantages in their dependencies which they are anxious to 
retain.’15 The Dutch, wrote George Kennan, head of the Policy Planning 
Staff, in December 1948, had to come to terms with the Indonesian 
nationalists. ‘The choice’, he insisted, ‘lies not between Republican and 
Dutch sovereignty (...) but between Republican sovereignty and chaos. We 
know that chaos is an open door to communism.’16
 In contrast to Indonesia, however, the independence movement in 
Indochina was led by communists.17 This made it even more difficult for 
the most influential decision makers in Washington to throw their weight 
behind Ho Chi Minh and the Viet Minh. They knew that Ho’s connections 
with Moscow in the postwar years had not been close. But they also knew 
that Ho had spent several years in Soviet Russia during the 1930s, that he 
was a communist. The United States could not take chances allowing a 
communist to come to power, notwithstanding his nationalist credentials 
and popular support. Ho ‘is the strongest and perhaps ablest figure in 
Indochina’, commented one State Department report.18 But he could not be 
trusted. Secretary of State George C. Marshall put the matter bluntly in 
February 1947: ‘Ho Chi Minh has direct Communist connections and it 
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should be obvious that we are not interested in seeing colonial empire 
administrations supplanted by [the] philosophy and political organization 
directed from and controlled by [the] Kremlin.’19
 But still, the Americans were wary of supporting the French in the 
armed struggle they began to wage in 1946 against the Vietminh. Marshall 
and his successor, Dean Acheson, wanted the French to put non-
communist nationalist leaders who would collaborate with the West yet 
maintain support of the people in power. They were not happy when in 
stead, the French restored Bao Dai, the former emperor of Vietnam, to 
power in March 1949. They doubted that he had the will or capacity to 
compete with Ho and the Vietminh and rally the people behind him. 
Nonetheless, in 1949 and 1950, the Truman administration, even before the 
outbreak of hostilities in Korea, came around to giving lukewarm support to 
this solution.20 The Communist seizure of power in China made it seem all 
the more important to thwart another communist victory in Vietnam. ‘The 
extension of communist authority in China’, wrote George Kennan, 
‘represents a grievous political defeat for us; if [Southeast Asia] is swept by 
communism we shall have suffered a major political rout the repercussions 
of which will be felt throughout the rest of the world, especially in the 
Middle East and in a then critically exposed Australia.’21 In May 1950, 
Secretary of State Acheson told European leaders that ‘[f]rom our viewpoint 
the Soviet Union possesses position of domination in China which it is 
using to threaten Indochina, push in Malaya, stir up trouble in Philippines, 
and now to start trouble in Indonesia.’22 
 Once the People’s Republic of China and the Soviet Union 
recognized Ho’s government in Vietnam in January 1950, Truman, 
Acheson, and their colleagues felt they had no other option than to support 
the French and the Bao Dai solution. When friends of Chiang Jieshi in the 
U.S. Senate passed the China Aid Act to support the Nationalist leader, now 
in Taiwan, Acheson decided to use some of the funds to assist the French 
and thwart the Vietminh in Indochina.23 The CIA estimated that Ho had 
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the support of eighty percent of the population; a State Department 
Working Group calculated that he controlled two-thirds of the country.24 
But Acheson could not contemplate supporting him. Soviet recognition of 
Ho meant he was a ‘mortal enemy’ of true independence. The United States 
established formal diplomatic relations with Bao Dai.25
 Concern with Japan was critical to the evolution of U.S. policy in 
Indochina. According to George Kennan, building strength in the industrial 
core of northeast Asia was critical to the success of America’s overall 
containment policies. ‘Our primary goal’ in Asia, wrote Kennan in January 
1948, is to insure that our security ‘must never again be threatened by the 
mobilization against us of the complete industrial area [in the Far East] as it 
was during the second world war.’26 Japan needed to be rehabilitated and 
co-opted into an American-led orbit. But Army officials in Japan who were 
running the occupation and their superiors in the Pentagon and in the State 
Department believed that Japan could not be rehabilitated unless Japan had 
access to the markets and raw materials of Indochina and Southeast Asia. 
‘Japan’s economic recovery’, insisted Army Assistant Secretary Tracy 
Voorhees, ‘depends upon keeping Communism out of Southeast Asia, 
promoting economic recovery there and in further developing those 
countries (...) as the principal trading areas for Japan.’27
 Once hostilities erupted in Korea, these views hardened. Japan was 
the key to northeast Asia. Japanese bases, of course, were essential for 
waging limited war in Korea. But far more important would be Japan’s 
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industrial infrastructure and human resources in a protracted hot war or an 
interminable cold war. But those resources could slip into the Soviet bloc if 
the Japanese people turned against the West or if the Japanese economy was 
sucked into a communist orbit. The occupation, therefore, had to end and 
the Japanese people had to be convinced that their well-being rested with 
the West. But their well-being could not be insured and even more 
important their loyalty to the West could not be relied upon if they 
established trading ties with communist China akin to those they had had 
for most of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Therefore, 
alternative trade outlets had to be found in Indochina and Southeast Asia, 
and the raw materials of the region and its surplus rice had to be available 
for Japanese consumption. ‘Rice, rubber, and tin’, said Assistant Secretary of 
State Dean Rusk in 1951, constituted ‘the consummate prize of Southeast 
Asia.’28 In fact, during 1950 and 1951, Japanese imports and exports to the 
region multiplied. In 1951, it was the only region in the world in which 
Japan had a large positive trade balance.29
 Secretary of State Dean Acheson asked the prominent Republican 
lawyer John Foster Dulles to oversee the negotiation of the Japanese peace 
and security treaties in 1951 and 1952. At the very least, this was Acheson’s 
attempt to forge bipartisan support to insure future passage of the treaties 
through the U.S. Senate. In working on these treaties, Dulles’ views about 
the importance of Indochina and Southeast Asia were solidified. Dulles 
started with the assumption that ‘the future of the world depends largely on 
whether the Soviet Union will be able to get control over Western Germany 
and Japan by means short of war.’ If it did, ‘the world balance of power 
would be profoundly altered.’ Hence Japan could not be allowed to trade 
with Communist China. Noting that before World War II, twenty percent 
of Japan’s exports went to China, Dulles believed that new outlets had to be 
found in the ‘underdeveloped areas of Southeast Asia.’30
 Thinking of this sort dictated that the United States could not permit 
Indochina and Southeast Asia to be lost to communism. Therefore, in 1951 
and 1952, top officials in the Truman administration boosted their 
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assistance to the French in their war against the Vietminh. Acheson believed 
that the French were fighting the same enemy in Vietnam as the Americans 
were fighting in Korea. Once the Chinese communists intervened in Korea 
in November 1950 and increased their assistance to Ho, Acheson was more 
and more convinced that the United States should accelerate its support to 
the French. Some of his subordinates remonstrated against French refusal 
to find a good alternative to Bao Dai and to cede real power to moderate 
nationalists. Acheson and top defense officials like Robert Lovett fully 
concurred. But they resisted arguments that the Americans should take over 
the war from the French. It was smarter and cheaper, they believed, to have 
the French wage the war and to organize an effective Vietnamese army than 
to have Americans pay the full price of defeating Ho’s Vietminh. ‘What we 
have been trying to do’, Acheson explained in 1952, ‘is to encourage [the 
French] and help them do everything we can to keep them doing what they 
are doing, which is taking the primary responsibility for this fight in 
Indochina, and not letting them in any way transfer it to us.’31
 
 
Eisenhower and Diem 
 
When Dwight Eisenhower won the presidential election in 1952 and 
selected John Foster Dulles as his secretary of state policy did not change at 
all. During 1953 and 1954, the United States was supporting about eighty 
percent of the costs of the French war effort in Indochina.32 According to 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Department of State, there was little 
alternative. ‘Loss of Southeast Asia’, they said, would ‘result in such 
economic and political pressures upon Japan as to make it extremely 
difficult to prevent Japan’s accommodation to Communism.’33 Nor did 
Dulles want to antagonize the French when he so desperately wanted their 
cooperation in support of the rearmament of West Germany and its 
integration either into the European Defense Community or NATO.34
 But during 1953 and 1954, the French war effort in Indochina 
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faltered badly. The Vietminh surrounded French forces at the garrison at 
Dien Bien Phu, not far from the Laotian border. Eisenhower and Dulles 
pondered the possibility of direct U.S. intervention. They thought of using 
American air power from aircraft carriers and bases in Okinawa and the 
Philippines. We ‘must not lose Asia’, Eisenhower declared. On April 4, 
1954, he wrote Prime Minister Churchill that a communist victory in 
Indochina would place ‘economic pressures on Japan which would be 
deprived of non-communist markets and sources of food and raw 
materials.’ As a result, Tokyo could not ‘be prevented from reaching an 
accommodation with the communist world which would combine the 
manpower and natural resources of Asia with the industrial potential of 
Japan.’35
 Eisenhower deliberated, came close to deploying U.S. forces, but 
decided not to do so. American legislators did not seem supportive; nor 
were the British. The prospects for military success were bleak. The French 
no longer had the will to prevail. They surrendered at Dien Bien Phu just as 
an international conference was convening in Geneva to decide the fate of 
the country.36
 The United States did not intervene militarily in the spring of 1954, 
but Eisenhower administration officials remained determined to thwart a 
communist takeover of the entire region. At Geneva, the French and 
Vietnamese agreed to cease fighting and to demarcate a temporary division 
line at the 17th parallel. The country eventually would be reunified through 
free elections. Laos and Cambodia would become independent nations. The 
United States did not sign the Geneva Accords, but acknowleged them 
publicly and intimated that it would not interfere with their fulfillment.37 
Nonetheless, on the very next day Dulles acknowledged privately to his 
colleagues, ‘the great problem from now on out was whether we could 
salvage what the Communists had ostensibly left out of their grasp in 
Indochina.’38 Knowing that in free elections Ho would win, both President 
Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles agreed that ‘our real objective 
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should be to avoid having any such elections.’39  
 Dulles favored the creation of a regional defense organization, the 
Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO), to protect Indochina from 
external or internal aggression. The organization would cover the areas of 
Indochina (South Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia) that had not already been lost 
to Ho and to the alleged worldwide communist conspiracy headquartered in 
Moscow, but orchestrated throughout Asia by Mao’s People’s Republic of 
China. At meetings of the National Security Council, Eisenhower and 
Dulles acknowledged that in the future the United States might have to 
intervene militarily to prevent local subversion, but they wanted flexibility. 
Should subversion occur, they agreed that the United States should be 
prepared to use forces either locally or against ‘the external source of such 
subversion or rebellion (including Communist China if determined to be the 
source).’40
 The United States then decided to recognize and support the 
government of Ngo Dinh Diem in South Vietnam. Diem had been invited 
back to Vietnam by Bao Dai in the Spring of 1954 and appointed prime 
minister. Diem was a fervent nationalist, a reality recognized even by Ho 
Chi Minh who had offered Diem a cabinet position in 1945. But Diem was 
also a catholic in a Buddhist country. A French-speaking Vietnamese with 
an aristocratic bent, he was staunchly anti-communist. He was also aloof, 
secretive and authoritarian. He relied on his brothers and extensive family 
connections to rule South Vietnam, as well as on support from a small but 
influential cadre of American politicians and church leaders who he had met 
and cultivated during a brief residence in the United States. After he 
consolidated power by exercising force effectively in 1955, the Eisenhower 
administration decided he was their man in Vietnam. Between 1955 and 
1961, Diem’s government received about $250 million annually from the 
United States, making it the fifth largest recipient of U.S. aid worldwide. 
This assistance constituted about 58 percent of the country’s budget.41
 In South Vietnam, the United States embraced the policy of nation-
building. South Vietnam had no history as an authentic entity, or as an 
independent state. South Vietnam was the area south of the seventeenth 
parallel, where, by the design of the Geneva Conference, French troops 
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would assemble before leaving the country. After Ho’s forces regrouped 
north of this parallel, elections were supposed to take place within two years 
to unify the northern and southern parts of Vietnam. But none of the great 
powers, least of all the United States, was eager for these elections to occur. 
Instead, Eisenhower and his advisers wanted to modernize and uplift South 
Vietnam and make it a successful outpost for containing the spread of 
communism in Southeast Asia. ‘American strategists were convinced’, 
writes the historian Robert MacMahon, ‘that Vietnam’s unification under a 
communist regime would deal a severe geopolitical and psychological blow 
to the prestige and credibility of the United States, embolden China and the 
Soviet Union, undermine the independence of other states in the region, 
rock Japan, and ravage SEATO.’42 These assumptions and views were 
widely accepted in the United States by Democrats as well as Republicans. 
In a speech in 1956, Senator John F. Kennedy maintained that South 
Vietnam ‘represents the cornerstone of the free world in Southeast Asia, the 
keystone in the arch, the finger in the dike (...). It is our offspring [and] we 
cannot abandon it, we cannot ignore its needs.’43
 
 
Kennedy and U.S. Credibility 
 
Speeches like Kennedy’s and policies like Eisenhower’s attached more and 
more importance to South Vietnam. The initial impetus behind U.S. policies 
- to avoid alienating France and to expedite the reconstruction and cooption 
of Japanese power - lost their saliency in the late 1950s, once the French left 
Indochina and Japan’s economic recovery became self-sustaining. But in 
pursuit of these goals, the United States had assumed leadership in the fight 
against the Vietminh and the support of a rival government in South 
Vietnam. Increasingly, American prestige was vested in making South 
Vietnam a successful enterprise. Strategic and material considerations 
became less and less salient. By the time Kennedy assumed the presidency 
in January 1961, psychological factors like prestige and credibility shaped 
American attitudes and policies. This was particularly so because the 
Americans believed they were immersed in a worldwide ideological struggle 
with the Kremlin to gain influence in the Third World, where nationalist 
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liberation movements were pulsating and new nations were forming.44
 Nikita Khrushchev was now the leader of Soviet Russia. He was a 
true believer in Marxism-Leninism, and believed communism promised a 
better future for all peoples. He embraced the idea of peaceful coexistence 
and relished the ideological competition with the United States. He reached 
out to nationalist leaders in the Third World and was willing to extend aid 
and sponsor huge development projects. His fervor was reinforced, if not 
inspired, by a sense of rivalry with his comrades in Beijing, who were now 
challenging the Kremlin for leadership among revolutionary nationalist 
leaders. In early January 1961, Khrushchev gave a speech to Soviet 
ideologists and propagandists. He talked about coexistence and said nuclear 
war would be an incalculable disaster, but he heralded wars of national 
liberation. They were ‘sacred’ and ‘inevitable’. Socialism, he proclaimed, 
would triumph over capitalism. Khrushchev’s words were disseminated 
publicly on the eve of Kennedy’s inauguration. They had a huge impact on 
the young American president.45
 Kennedy, like his predecessors, believed he was locked in a fierce 
struggle with Soviet-led world communism. Notwithstanding his awareness 
of the growing split between Soviet Russia and Communist China, Kennedy 
wanted to thwart communist advances everywhere. ‘We are opposed 
around the world’, he declared in April 1961, ‘by a monolithic and ruthless 
conspiracy that relies primarily on covert means for expanding its sphere of 
influence.’ Khrushchev, he understood, wanted to avoid war and pursue the 
struggle through insurrection and subversion. If successful in places like 
Vietnam, Kennedy, warned, ‘the gates will be opened wide.’46 In November 
1961, Kennedy wrote Khrushchev asking him to exert pressure on Ho’s 
government to stop undermining Diem. Otherwise, he warned, the United 
States would have to consider additional means to support the viability and 
integrity of South Vietnam.47 Kennedy meant what he said. He and his 
advisers believed in counterinsurgency warfare and modernization theory. 
They could and would apply theory, mobilize resources, and harness 
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technology to successfully build a nation. Between Kennedy’s inauguration 
and his death, the number of U.S. military advisers in South Vietnam went 
from about 900 to almost 16,000. Extensive efforts were made to 
implement a strategic hamlet program in the countryside. When Diem’s 
regime became less and less popular, programs to win support in the 
countryside floundered, and Buddhists protested Diem’s growing 
authoritarianism, Kennedy tacitly approved a military coup to overthrow 
Diem, thereby increasing the likelihood that the United States would have 
to assume growing responsibility for the new government.48 
 What is so striking about this growing commitment is that concrete 
strategic and economic motives played such a small role in shaping policy. 
More than anything, credibility and prestige were now the calculus 
determining America’s growing embroilment. In a typical intelligence 
report, high level officials were informed that Cambodia, Thailand, Burma, 
Indonesia, the Philippines, and Nationalist China were all viewing events in 
Laos as a ‘gauge of U.S. willingness and ability to help an anti-communist 
Asian government stand against a Communist “national liberation” 
campaign. They will almost certainly look upon the struggle for Vietnam as 
a critical test of such U.S. willingness and ability. All of them, including the 
neutrals, would probably suffer demoralization and loss of confidence in 
their prospects for maintaining their independence if the communists were 
to gain control of South Vietnam. This loss of confidence might even 
extend to India.’49
 The agreement to neutralize Laos, laboriously negotiated in 1961 and 
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1962, meant that it was even more important to take a strong stand to 
defeat the communists inside South Vietnam. Otherwise, confidence in 
American guarantees would wane even more. Many historians, like Gary 
Hess, Robert McMahon and John Gaddis stress that the symbolic 
importance of Vietnam far outweighed its strategic and economic 
significance. ‘The president and his senior aides’, writes MacMahon, ‘feared 
that a communist victory in Vietnam would further embolden aggressive 
adversaries in Moscow and Beijing while leading its allies to doubt U.S. 
power and resolve.’ Kennedy and his advisers could not tolerate the thought 
of appearing weak. Weakness meant humiliation. Credibility would be 
shattered. Additional dominos would fall throughout the region. Hence, 
negotiations to neutralize Vietnam were ruled out; more and more military 
advisers were sent in.50
 Because they assign so much importance to credibility, more 
historians are probing the cultural assumptions and psychological 
dimensions of U.S. decision makers. According to historians like Michael 
Hunt and Loren Baritz, Americans’ sense of their own mission as God’s 
chosen people, inherited from Puritan mythology and theology, played a 
decisive role. ‘Above all else’, writes Hunt, ‘Vietnam figured (...) as a test - a 
test of American character and ideals. How Americans responded was a 
kind of referendum on their world leadership and the viability of their 
institutions and values.’51 But it was more than that, according to Robert D. 
Dean. In his book, Imperial Brotherhood, Dean argues that Vietnam was a test 
of American manliness, of cultural tropes, buried deep in the psyche of an 
elite class of male decision makers that rose to prominence after World War 
II. They embodied an ‘imperial masculinity’ tied to patterns of class and 
education; they assumed privilege and power and had an instinct for 
toughness.52 They believed that their superior ideals, their advanced 
technology, and their efficient and enlightened managerial practices meant 
that they could and should prevail over adversaries, adversaries whom they 
could not understand and whose humanity and ideals were denied.53
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 These interpretations are suggestive, but they should not be 
overstated. New evidence, for example, suggests that Kennedy remained 
extremely reluctant to deploy combat troops to Vietnam and that he was 
pondering retrenchment and withdrawal at the time of his assassination. In 
other words, the cult of manliness and the sense of moral superiority did 
not stifle reflection and reassessment. In fact, Kennedy’s successful 
handling of the Cuban missile crisis afforded him the self-confidence to 
reconsider the American commitment to Indochina.54
 
 
Johnson and the Inevitable Tragedy 
 
When Lyndon Baines Johnson assumed the presidency in November 1963, 
the situation in Vietnam was deteriorating rapidly. In the aftermath of the 
overthrow and murder of Diem, the generals who carried out the coup had 
difficulty consolidating power. The Viet Cong and National Liberation 
Front continued to make substantial gains in the countryside. Johnson 
immediately pushed for more determined, more aggressive action to thwart 
a communist victory. When Senator Mike Mansfield told Johnson of his 
deep misgivings about the American embroilment in Vietnam, Johnson 
asked his top advisers, all inherited from Kennedy, to comment. McGeorge 
Bundy, the National Security advisor, warned against any negotiated deal 
aimed at neutralization. The communists would gradually seize power and 
other dominos would fall in the region. Secretary of State Dean Rusk 
concurred. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara reiterated that the 
United States was confronted with ‘a test of U.S. firmness and specifically a 
test of U.S. capacity to deal with wars of national liberation.’ The stakes 
were so high, he concluded, ‘we must go on bending every effort to win.’55 
Such advice reinforced Johnson’s own convictions stemming from his first 
trip to Vietnam when he was vice president. ‘The battle against 
communism’, Johnson wrote Kennedy in May 1961, ‘must be joined in 
Southeast Asia with strength and determination to achieve success there - or 
the United States, inevitably must surrender the Pacific and take up our 
defenses on our own shores.’56
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 In 1964, however, Johnson did not immediately escalate the war. His 
attention was riveted on winning election for the presidency against the 
conservative Republican candidate, Barry Goldwater. Johnson wanted to 
avoid any obvious setback in Indochina, but he also wanted to appear 
prudent. He did not want to scare the American people. Bundy warned him 
that if he accepted neutralization schemes or quit Saigon, the American 
people would treat him as badly as they had treated President Truman and 
Secretary of State Acheson during the Korean War.57 Johnson was fearful 
that a defeat in Vietnam might trigger a political backlash that might destroy 
his Great Society domestic programs. Subsequently, Johnson acknowledged, 
‘I knew that Harry Truman and Dean Acheson had lost their effectiveness 
from the day the Communists took over China. I believed that the loss of 
China had played a large role in the rise of Joe McCarthy. And I knew that 
all these problems, taken together, were chickenshit compared with what 
might happen if we lost Vietnam.’58 According to the historian Larry 
Berman, Johnson believed that defeat in Vietnam ‘would be political suicide 
and result in political paralysis for the next three years.’59
 Although domestic politics and his concerns for his reform programs 
clearly reinforced the predilections of Johnson to avoid neutralizing or 
‘losing’ South Vietnam, these factors were not decisive. Two major books 
by the historians David Kaiser and Fredrik Logevall minimize the 
significance of partisan politics. ‘At the end of 1964’, writes Logevall, ‘a 
large percentage of Americans were apathetic about Vietnam.’ Few wanted 
to escalate the war; substantial minorities favored some sort of negotiated 
settlement.60 The president had room to maneuver. ‘The Johnson 
administration’, emphasizes Kaiser, ‘did not decide upon the war out of fear 
of a right-wing backlash, or because of a belief that Congress or the 
American public demanded it, or as a means of saving the Great Society 
(...). While both the Congress and the public could be expected generally to 
support military action against Communism, neither had shown the slightest 
enthusiasm for such a course, and both would have been delighted to have 
been spared this rather dubious venture.’61
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 So, Johnson had room to maneuver. In 1954, Eisenhower decided 
not to use air power to assist the French at Dien Bien Phu; in 1961 and 
1962, Kennedy consistently refused to deploy combat troops; yet in late 
1964 and the first half of 1965, Johnson chose to bomb North Vietnam and 
to send hundreds of thousands of American combat troops to defeat the 
Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese. Johnson’s decisions were critical. 
Most historians now believe that his personality and his style of leadership 
were particularly ill suited for the challenges he faced in Vietnam. ‘He was a 
man with a passion for success and a yearning for greatness’, writes George 
Herring. He was emotional, impulsive, and impatient. He demanded loyalty. 
He could not abide the thought that he would be held responsible for 
‘losing’ Vietnam to the communists.62 ‘Johnson’s profound personal 
insecurity and his egomania’, Fredrik Logevall stresses, ‘led him not only to 
personalize the goals he aspired to but also to personalize all forms of 
dissent.’63 When Johnson made the key decisions for war in 1964 and 1965, 
he did all he could to manage the debate among his advisers, avoid 
systematic consideration of options to disengage, and conceal the 
significance of his decisions from the American public.64
 Johnson’s decisions were tragic. He sought to act nobly, but his 
flawed character, his insecurity, his egocentrism, led to disaster for himself, 
for his country’s foreign policy, and, most of all, for the Vietnamese people. 
He believed he was acting nobly, thwarting the forces of evil, of 
communism. And so did his key advisers. At a critical meeting at the White 
House on July 23, 1965, the discourse resonated with memories of the past. 
‘Can’t we see the similarity to our indolence at Munich?’ commented Henry 
Cabot Lodge, the U.S. ambassador to Vietnam. If the United States did not 
honor its commitment to safeguard South Vietnam, said Dean Rusk, ‘there 
was no telling where [the communists] would stop their expansionism. ‘The 
world, the country, and the Vietnamese people’, said McGeorge Bundy, 
‘would have alarming reactions if we got out.’ Wouldn’t we lose our 
credibility, said President Johnson, if we withdrew? ‘Our honor is at stake. 
Our word is at stake.’65 When the enemy was worldwide communism, such 
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matters could not be taken lightly. Fundamentally, emphasizes David 
Kaiser, the ‘decision to fight in South Vietnam in 1965 grew above all out of 
an obsession with avoiding the mistakes, as the administration leaders saw 
them, of the 1930s.’66
 Although much responsibility must be assigned to President 
Johnson, there nonetheless was a sense of inevitability about the decision. 
The credibility of the United States as a nation, its honor and prestige, and 
that of the president, would not have been vested in a victory in Vietnam if 
not for the decisions made by Presidents Roosevelt, Truman, and 
Eisenhower over the preceding twenty years. Those decisions initially were 
limited decisions based on geopolitical and economic imperatives of waging 
the Cold War against the Soviet Union. Concrete and understandable 
European priorities impelled Truman to withhold recognition of the 
Vietminh and avoid antagonizing the French. Notwithstanding recognition 
of Ho’s popularity as a nationalist leader, his communist credentials 
invalidated him as a legitimate leader once containment assumed the 
strategic rationale of all U.S. foreign policy. Soon thereafter, the imperatives 
of Japanese reconstruction meant that the United States could not allow 
Japan to get sucked into a communist orbit once Mao and his comrades had 
seized power in China. Although these strategic and economic justifications 
waned in the late 1950s, the United States by then had invested so many 
resources and so much prestige that disengagement became harder even 
while the prospects for success diminished. Kennedy grasped the dilemmas. 
He might have managed disengagement after the 1964 elections, if he had 
won a decisive victory.67 But he was assassinated before he had a chance to 
confront the actual loss of South Vietnam. His successor, Lyndon Johnson, 
was less attuned to pitfalls, more arrogant, more ethnocnetric, more 
insecure. But his options would have been vastly different if not for the 
actions of his predecessors. Their choices, not his, made his choices 
inevitable; their choices, as much as his, made Vietnam an inevitable 
tragedy. 
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